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am pleased to discuss this paper, an excellent one
to ﬁnish the conference.  Dave Richardson’s paper,
potentially quite important, is a conceptual exercise
aimed squarely at answering perhaps the biggest
question facing the World Trade Organization (WTO).
How can the global trading system accommodate
pressures for revision along less commercial, and
more social, lines in a sensible way that would not
destroy its effectiveness?  It is a question that trade
economists have been ignoring in the vain hope that
it will go away.
The question will not disappear because the
pressures involved are real and powerful.  They
come from several sources and it is worth mention-
ing the primary ones.  First, there are environmental
concerns that range from legitimate issues involving
cross-border externalities to very localized questions
regarding the sovereignty of community-level
environmental regulations.   People are concerned
and confused about the WTO in this context.  This is
evident from the fact that no amount of explaining
local regulations would escape the WTO’s purview
(not to mention interest) by virtue of de mimimus
exceptions seems to be convincing.  Richardson
excludes environmental concerns from his list of
potential WTO extensions, evidently because he con-
siders environmental regulations not to be market-
supportive in the sense he deﬁnes.  I am sympathetic
with this view, but it does not do much to mollify the
WTO’s opponents.
A second set of concerns involves labor rights,
sometimes labeled human rights.  These complaints
are broad-based and aimed at forcing developing
countries to educate their children, eliminate dis-
crimination, end coerced labor, and permit free
association and collective bargaining.  It is difﬁcult to
see a legitimate and effective role for the WTO here
because the issues are largely not trade-related and
raise clear questions of national sovereignty.
Nonetheless, Dave has found one case–seemingly 
a small one, but it is not–in which the WTO could be
extended.  It is consistent with liberalization in
services under the General Agreement on Trade in
Services (GATS) accord to allow free trade in labor
representation services.
A third area stems from the apparent difﬁculties
that countries have in managing the costs of techno-
logical change and economic globalization.  It is now
conventional wisdom among non-economists that
trade liberalization worsens income inequality in
both developed and developing economies.  Whatever
the truth of such claims, they raise interest in sup-
porting labor incomes through trade restrictions, par-
ticularly in the wealthy nations.  Globalization is
blamed further for raising the risks of consumption,
especially of goods produced using new technology.
Biotechnology raises public health concerns and
worries about the safety of foods and the potential
for unforeseen environmental responses.  It is a curious
feature of modern life in developed economies that
as they have become richer and the inherent risks in
living have fallen dramatically, people place inordinate
weight on the avoidance of even small risks.  In such
an environment, where many people also fail to
understand the basics of probability and risk, it
becomes easy to imagine damages emanating from
the opaque processes of globalization.
With this background, Richardson essentially
makes three major points underlying his policy
propositions.  First, he argues that public support for
the WTO system is waning and must be restored by a
bit of consorting with those who would inject social
regulations.  While trade purists ﬁnd this idea an
anathema, it bears thinking through because the
potential beneﬁts in terms of saving the trading
system could be worth the costs.  Moreover, it is pos-
sible to put this erosion on something of a logical
basis.  After all, social standards in the environmental
and labor areas clearly are goods or inputs with
highly elastic income demands.  The United States
and the European Union have such high relative
incomes that they can afford to be bothered by weak
foreign standards.  Further, there is a growing recog-
nition that there are missing markets and other failures
that may (or may not) be exacerbated by international
trade and investment.
Among these missing markets are:
• Chronic under-representation of future 
generations;
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• Information asymmetries and risks at the
international level that cannot be managed
by private insurance markets;
• Weak incentives for recognizing the value of
investments in information goods (intellectual
property);
• Political and economic failures, especially 
in developing nations, that prevent the estab-
lishment of sound and pro-competitive
market regulation.
Recognizing this problem leads to Richardson’s
second main thesis, which is that economists do not
pay sufﬁcient attention to the importance of regu-
lating markets.  After all, consider the principles 
textbooks in economics, which pay virtually no
attention to regulatory provisions supporting the
efﬁcient functioning of markets.  In practice, regu-
lations are widespread at both the national and
sub-national levels.  In principle, then, they should
extend to the international level. The WTO already
is a system of international regulation and really 
the only effective one because it has a dispute-
settlement mechanism.  The issue is how, and how
comprehensively, this system should be extended.
Trade economists tend to take one of three views 
in pondering this question.
First, the purists believe that if an issue is not
directly trade-related and damages may not be
assessed in a straightforward manner, it should re-
main outside the WTO.  Anything else would make
the system dirty and be subject to political capture.
Certainly there is precedent for this view in the form
of the atrociously protectionist antidumping laws
advanced by the United States and Europe and now
in widespread use around the globe.
Second, the abstract view would identify the prin-
ciples on which one would support a WTO approach
to social regulation.  The main principles are:
• Is the issue directly trade-related?
• Are there cross-border externalities involved?
• Do countries have incentives to engage in a
race to the bottom in standards without coor-
dinated intervention?
• Do standards help support the development
of markets?
• Is dispute resolution meaningful?
• Does the issue ﬁt systemically with the WTO
mission and competence?
In my view, a rigorous application of these prin-
ciples would show that environmental standards and
labor rights do not belong in the WTO, but should be
handled in alternative policy designs. As Richardson
points out, however, it is misleading to lump all aspects
of such standards together.  There may be components
of environmental protection or labor rights that meet
enough of these criteria to be included.
A third approach, associated primarily with
Dani Rodrik, would be to give some controlled
voice to the concerns of citizens in rich countries
about standards in poor countries and to permit
trade sanctions after some set of public deliber-
ations takes place.  I would argue against such a
policy because of the near certainty it would fall
prey to narrow protectionist interests.
Richardson’s third main thesis rounds all of
this together.  It is that the WTO implicitly is being
forced to deal with trade in factors—in addition to
trade in goods and services.  After all, competition
policy aimed at regulating foreign direct investment
and mergers could promote external competition.
Protection of technological inventions through intel-
lectual property rights could support trade in infor-
mation.  Trade in business services is a form of trade
in labor.  Why not, then, extend WTO disciplines to
labor rights?  The most effective solution to weak
labor rights would be to permit free labor migration.
Labor cannot be traded directly in greater quantities,
however, because of migration costs and political
opposition.  Richardson’s solution is ingenious.  It
is perfectly consistent with market liberalization to
permit trade in labor services, where such services
represent worker interests.  Here is a way for free
association and collective bargaining to enter the
WTO: If international labor unions were free to
enter nations and organize workers there would be
both greater efﬁciency in labor representation and
stronger effective worker rights.  Note carefully that
such a proposal requires, as a prior matter, that
countries recognize in their laws the right to free
association.  Combined with free trade in worker rep-
resentation, this change could enhance efﬁciency.
Assembling all of this, Richardson implicitly sets
out a criterion for permitting “social” issues into
the WTO.  Regulations must be market-supportive,
in the sense of promoting contestability of somemarket that is missing or monopolized, and they
must be directly trade-related.  This simple prescrip-
tion seems to be broad and subject to considerable
abuse;  but, I ﬁnd it to be clean, relatively precise,
and demanding.  It is demanding because it may be
seen that Richardson could only ﬁnd three areas in
which it ﬁts.  These are a modest competition policy
agenda, unspeciﬁed mechanisms for promoting tech-
nology diffusion through the global economy on
reasonable terms, and free trade in union services.
The principle also has the virtue of placing the
burden of proof on advocates of extending the WTO
into extensive social regulation.
Thus, overall I greatly admire the basic principle
and I encourage Richardson to push it forward and
test its limits.  At present, however, it is worth making
some comments and suggestions.  First, as intriguing
as it is, the analysis is vague at this time.  We need
theories and models to be sure we are talking about
issues that really meet the basic principle.  For exam-
ple, we need models of the political economy of
regulation to explain why regulations are so weak
and what forms of resistance might be expected.  It
would help to analyze the determinants of missing
markets and the optimal interventions that would
address them.  In Richardson’s conception, for
instance, we would apply two instruments—social
regulation and trade sanctions—to ﬁx international
market failures.  We would like to know circum-
stances under which this truly makes sense.  It is
not clear to me that such models would support
Richardson’s WTO approach in some cases of tech-
nology trade.  On the other hand, modeling could
determine other areas in which his conception is
sensible.  Finally, we need analysis of the effective-
ness of international regulations supported by trade
sanctions.  How would this affect compliance?  Would
fines be better?
Furthermore, we need to have the details of
proposed policies spelled out.  Richardson should
put considerably more meat on his skeleton.  His
proposal is fundamentally about the architecture of
the trading system.  The author argues that market-
supporting regulation must be a foundation of the
structure.  Fair enough, but we must develop detailed
blueprints.  Permit me to provide some ﬁnal com-
mentary on the kinds of policies that might make
sense in this context.
First, the competition policy framework should
be written more broadly and placed more quickly
into the WTO than is argued by Richardson.  Com-
petition policy will be important for developing
countries as they address issues in intellectual
property licensing and foreign direct investment.
Without some agreement on what may be invoked
here I fear numerous disputes emerging without
much probative value.  Second, while I agree with
Richardson’s suggestions for a pro-diffusion treat-
ment of technology trade, this must be done by
balancing the existing Trade Related Intellectual
Property (TRIPs) Agreement more toward technol-
ogy transfer and learning.  It would be useful to
clarify a number of issues here, such as the allow-
able scope for fair use and reverse engineering, the
implementation of commitments by developed
countries to enhance technology transfer, consider-
ation of guidelines on anti-competitive licensing
practices, and the need to keep the internet free of
trade barriers as well as subsidizing its extension to
developing countries.  It would be important also to
implement measures to promote research and
development in treatments for diseases endemic to
poor countries and to share those treatments on
reasonable terms.  Finally, competition measures
should be put into place to avoid monopolization
of global seed technologies.
For its part, Richardson’s proposal for free trade
in labor services is ingenious and deserves thorough
airing.  It would stand a better chance of acceptance
if he would spell out exactly what is envisioned and
what competition among labor service providers
would entail.  Would there also be competition reg-
ulation aimed at monopoly labor unions?  Would,
say, the American Federation of Labor and Congress
of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) really think
this proposal would sufﬁciently advance its interests
that it would then be willing to support further
trade liberalization?
In that context, I have three ﬁnal questions
for the author to consider.  First, are his proposals
enough?  Would they really generate enough
gainers to channel all of the rest of the anti-trade
sentiment into other directions?  Keep in mind that
there would be losers as well.  Second, if these pro-
posals are not enough, are we skating on ice that is
too thin by inviting numerous other, less worthy
ideas?  Third, to what extent would these new pro-
cedures usher in abusive use of trade power?
Imagine an American labor union that fails in its
efforts to organize workers in Brazil, not because of
a closed labor market but because it simply loses
the contract.  Would not American authorities then
be under pressure to set market-share quotas in
labor representation?
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